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1. Introduction 
 
Doping in sport is widespread and shows little sign of abating. Only in 2016 in the run 
up to the Olympics did we witness several doping scandals.  
 
The excellent movie “The program” by Stephen Frears (2015) based on David 
Walsh’s book “Seven deadly sins” (2013) ends with a sentence from Lance 
Armstrong defending himself in front of the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
(USADA) after his demise: “From a fan perspective, you need to have a winner, and I 
feel like I won those 7 titles” (Tour de France 1999 to 2005). 
 
Lance’s point is that in an environment in which everybody is doping, there still is 
somebody who is faster than the others. This seems also to be the final take-home 
message of the movie, and is supported by empirical data around our reactive 
attitudes of blame and resentment for doping in professional sport (Atry 2012; 2013). 
The movie ends on the notes of Leonard Cohen’s immortal song “Everybody knows”, 
and with an unanswered question: If everybody knew about the Program in cycling, 
then is Lance Armstrong alone to blame? 
 
In this paper I first address the question of who is to blame in doping in sport. I then 
analyse the argument that lifting the ban on doping would be a solution to the 
widespread problem of doping in sport, and reject the argument on the basis that there 
would still be incentives for athletes to continue taking performance-enhancing 
substances secretively. Finally I propose an alternative solution based on shifting the 
liability for doping away individual athletes to those stakeholders who in a specific 
professional sport context hold most power and control over them. 
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2. Who is to blame? 
 
 
Empirical data suggest that athletes often dope as a result of extreme psychological 
pressure: they feel they have no alternative (King & Robeson 2007; King and 
Robeson 2011) to remain in the ‘game’. Alex Zuelle, for example, a former Swiss 
professional cyclist who rode for the Festina team and who tested positive for 
erythropoietin in 1998 (Landau 2013), said: 
 
“Everybody knew that the whole peloton was taking drugs and I had a 
choice. Either I buckle and go with the trend or I pack it in and go back to 
my old job as a painter. I regret lying but I couldn’t do otherwise”. 
(Hamilton and Coyle 2013, p.100) 
 
Hence, while choosing not to participate in doping is theoretically possible, in 
practice it can be extremely costly for the athletes, as it can amount to giving up being 
competitive, or even leaving the profession.  
 
This lack of alternatives (or, to be fair, existence of alternatives which would lead 
though to exiting the profession) is recognised by the public. Athletes are severely 
constrained in their choices. 
 
WADA works on the premise of strict liability, which means that athletes are deemed 
guilty whether or not they realised that they had taken a banned substance (paragraph 
2.2. WADA Code). 
 
However, there are several empirical although anecdotal data showing that fans do not 
hold athletes as the only ones responsible for doping behaviours; quite on the 
contrary, the teams, sports-physicians, and more recently in the cases of state-
sponsored doping, authorities are held co-responsible for doping. 
 
Atry and co-authors have developed the concept of “emotion cultures” or “emotion 
subcultures” in sport as social–affective states that have normative influence on 
individual athletes (Atry et al, 2012). These “emotion cultures” do not involve only 
individual athletes, but also other stakeholders in sport (e.g. fans, sponsors, coaches, 
managers, medical support teams, etc.). Within an emotion culture, norms and 
“reactive attitudes” (Strawson 2008) as regard to rule violation / doping in sport are 
generated and shaped, and they involve not only the athletes but also all stakeholders 
in professional sport. For examples, fans are held responsible for “corrupting the spirit 
of sport” with offensive behaviours (e.g. hooligans); states are (or were) held 
responsible for encouraging or conniving in doping behaviours (e.g. historical 
examples of state-sponsored behaviours alongside the most recent Russian case); and 
sponsors are held responsible for encouraging or condoning (by closing one or both 
eyes) doping behaviours or other behaviours considered morally unacceptable. 
 
This concept of “reactive attitude” is useful to ground the current discussion that 
athletes are not the only ones to blame for the continued presence of doping in 
professional sport. The question to ask is “Who is to blame?”, or in other words, 
“What is the appropriate target of our reactive attitudes in doping?” 
Manuscript accepted for Sport, Ethics and Philosophy on December 12th, 2016 
	  
	   3	  
 
As argued in a previous paper (Camporesi and McNamee 2014), athletes can be 
considered ‘guinea pigs’ in a system of unregulated clinical trials, where we have 
absolutely no data on the real performance enhancing effects of the substances they 
are taking. Deciding not to dope may often mean the end of a professional career. 
Responsibility and accountability should be placed on those who hold in place the 
incentives to continue doping. There are two kinds of incentives at place: 
 
1) competitive incentives linked to wanting to gain an edge over the opponent in 
order to gain: 
2) financial incentives linked to sponsorship contracts and tournament-prizes or 
record-breaking 
 
There are also disincentives in place in doping which are: 
 
1) fear of getting caught and having to serve a ban (because WADA puts strict 
liability on the athlete) 
2) health risks linked to use of performance-enhancing substances which are 
unregulated 
 
Let’s analyse these in turn to understand the ways in which the incentive structures of 
professional sport could be changed. 
 
 
3. The pay-off matrix of professional sports: incentives and disincentives to dope 
 
Researchers who study doping in sport have identified a series of factors that explain 
its continued presence Many of these can be summarized as the so-called ‘payoff 
matrix’ that athletes face in professional sports. In other words, the rewards or 
incentives – the competitive advantage and the financial gains that go with it (and 
other ‘externalities such as  fame, and visibility) - continue to outweigh the risks or 
disincentives of doping, which include not only being caught and punished, but also 
physical harm (both in the short term, and in the long term) to the athlete.  
 
There are plenty of empirical data to demonstrate that athletes decide the risks are 
worth it and continue to trade future health problems for short-term competitive 
advantage. (Waldron and Krane 2005; Krumer and Rosenboim 2011). 
 
Although the prevalence of doping in elite sport is difficult to measure and likely to 
vary substantially between different sports, according to a recent meta-review (the 
previous one dating back to 1997) it is estimated to be affecting on average between 
14 and 39 %, of athletes (de Hon et al, 2015), with this figure likely to increase 
significantly if recent state-sponsored doping scandals are taken into account. In 
addition, the authors note recent revelations by various elite cyclists underlined a 
discrepancy between true prevalence figures and positive doping tests (about 0.5 % of 
athletes). This discrepancy is probably not limited to cycling and casts serious doubts 
on the effectiveness of current anti-doping policies. 
 
In parallel, the true extent of the problem is seldom addressed (even with the Russian 
doping scandal), and so estimations on doping prevalence tend to vary to a large 
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degree, starting from ‘few’ to ‘all’ athletes. Similarly, as argued by Camporesi and 
McNamee (2014), there are absolutely no data on the real performance enhancing 
effects of many of the substances ingested by athletes that are also included in the 
Prohibited List. Athletes put their health at risk in the hope – often unfounded – of 
gaining a competitive advantage. We have referred to this as “enhancing 
misconception” drawing a parallel with research ethics context of “therapeutic 
misconception”.  
 
Note, the WADA Code does not require that a substance have a demonstrably 
performance-enhancing effect for it to be included on the Prohibited List, but only its 
potential (WADC 2015). That is because there are no clinical studies aimed at 
establishing the performance enhancing effects of these substances. As a matter of 
fact, the recent Olympics have given us a display of pseudo-science with the 
widespread use of ‘cupping’ in swimming as a performance enhancing technology 
(more probably, only working as a placebo. The same cannot be said of other 
substances that may pose very real health risks for their athletes) (Colqhuon 2016). 
  
One solution to the current impasse which has been suggested by some scholars 
would be to legalize doping and make it part of sport. Julian Savulescu has suggested 
this (most recently, in 2016), with the proviso that drugs be used ‘under medical 
control’. Competitors would be allowed to take performance-enhancing drugs as long 
as they were ‘safe’, where the bar of safety “should be set at the level we allow 
athletes as persons to take risks” (Savulescu 2016). In the same editorial, Savulescu 
has argued that that “we should shorten, not lengthen, the WADA banned list” and 
that “we should give up the principles that anything that enhances performance is 
against the spirit of sport and that the natural/artificial distinction has moral 
significance” (page 303, 2016). 
 
Rephrasing the proposal in terms of incentives and disincentives, Savulescu’s 
proposal would amount to the option ‘take openly’ of the prisoner’s dilemma outlined 
by Holm, which would amount to eliminating the disincentives a) i.e. fear of getting 
caught, and disregarding disincentive b) i.e. harms to health of the athlete on grounds 
of a libertarian approach according to which individuals should be free to exercise 
their own autonomy in terms of what kinds of risks they want to take in their life, be it 
in the sports context of in another context. 
 
I do not wish to enter here into the discussion of whether lifting the ban on doping 
would be counter to the spirit of sport or of Olympism. Others before me have 
successfully objected to Savulescu’s points on grounds that they are flawed 
(McNamee 2016) or that doping is contrary to excellence in sport (Devine JW 2010). 
Instead, in this paper I wish to reason from the premise that, even if we were to accept 
their argument that doping is not contrary – or perhaps it represents the essence – of 
competitive sport, the solution would not work from a pragmatic point of view.  
 
We reason on the basis of Holm’s approach that doping ‘under medical control’ even 
if ‘theoretically possible’, would be impossible in practice. In this sense I am adopting 
a pragmatic and not idealist solution to an ethical issue in sport. I will briefly 
recapitulate Holm’s argument before proceeding to spell out my alternative solution 
to lifting the ban on doping. 
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To the best of my knowledge Holm (2007) was the first to apply the game theoretical 
analysis to the case of doping in professional sport. He spells out in this context the 
four options typical of the classic game theory problem also known as the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ where the four options would be the following: 
 
1) take and hide 
2) take and tell 
3) don’t take (reject) and hide 
4) don’t take (reject) and tell 
 
The first option is the current scenario where athletes take performance-enhancing 
substances secretively. The consequences of this scenario are (more or less likely, 
given that there are no data on the real effects of most substances included in the 
Prohibited list) gaining a positional performance advantage, with the risk of possibly 
untreatable side effects. 
 
The second option is the one advocated by Julian Savulescu, i.e. take performance 
enhancing substances in the open, in a medically regulated regime. The consequences 
of this scenario are gaining possibly an absolute performance advantage, although not 
a positional one, as in this scenario the drug or substance is available to all athletes. In 
Holm’s words, the ‘take and tell’ scenario leads to a ‘competitive status quo’, i.e. 
things don’t change much, only the bar is raised for everybody, with of course 
different results as they start from different starting points. The risk of side effects is 
diminished as doping is put under a medical context and hence regulated and 
controlled. 
 
The third option, ‘don’t take (reject) and hide’ is not instantiated in the world of 
professional sport as it would amount to not take performance enhancing substances, 
and not doing so in the open. The competitive status quo would also be preserved, 
with no side effects.  
 
Finally, the fourth option, ‘don’t take (reject) and tell’ would amount to what we 
usually refer to as being a ‘clean athlete’, with all the disadvantages that go with it in 
the current system of widespread doping, i.e. a competitive disadvantage, although 
with no side effects from the substances. The fourth option is undesirable as clean 
athletes are regularly cheated out of medals by doping athletes (as happened to 
Andrew Steele and fellow teammates from Team GB at Beijing in 2008) (Rian and 
Ingle 2016). A reinstatement of a medal cannot make up for change of direction in life 
that the loss of the medal was responsible for, including the lack of financial support 
that would have made possible a professional career for the athlete. 
 
Holm’s analysis focuses only on the first option, ‘take and hide’, and spells out the 
two possible scenarios that would take place were a ban on doping to be lifted. In the 
first scenario, athletes have access to data on the effectiveness and side effects of the 
performance enhancing substances; while in the second scenario athletes get impartial 
advice from the sports doctor about when and how to dope. Importantly, Holm argues 
that in both scenarios, athletes would still have incentives to cheat, and a two-tiered 
system of doping (under a medical context and of secretive doping) would ensue. This 
would happen because athletes would have strong incentives to keep doping practices 
secretive in order to maintain an exclusive use on a drug, and therefore a competitive 
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advantage over fellow athletes. Secretiveness is an integral part of achieving and 
maintaining competitive advantage in any context (see, for example, Dufresne et al. 
2008), hence for professional athletes the option “take and hide” would remain the 
rational choice if doping were legalized.  
 
To be clear, this is not because doping would still be ‘risky’ for the health of the 
athletes (we are reasoning on the premise that individuals should be free to take 
whatever risk they want as long as it pertains to their own body) but because doping 
under a medical context would not eliminate the incentives to dope i.e. gaining a 
competitive advantage, and the financial rewards associated with it.  
 
In Savulescu’s instance of putting doping under a medical context, although the 
current disincentives of fear of getting caught would be eliminated, there would still 
be incentives to take other performance-enhancing drugs secretively (‘take and hide’) 
without sharing with fellow competitors in order to continue having that crucial 
competitive advantage which is necessary to win and gain the external financial 
benefits. For example, if we were to lift the ban on EPO, there would still be 
incentives to undergo genetic enhancement which is more difficult to detect and 
would achieve the same end by different means that cannot be detected when looking 
at haematocrit level. The same argument applies to other instances of lifting the ban 
on a particular substance: athletes would still have incentives to experiment with other 
performance-enhancing substances (or ‘supposedly’ so, as without hard data resulting 
from clinical trial we cannot know whether the performance enhancing effects are 
only expected or real) for which there is no test that can detect them. If we do not 
know what we should be testing for, we will have no tests for a particular substance. 
 
That is why, as long as the payoff matrix of professional sport remains unchanged, 
lifting the ban on doping would not lead to ‘safe doping’ under medical supervision, 
but would instead result in a two-tiered system of doping, where athletes would take 
some performance enhancing substances in the open in a medically controlled and 
regulated way, but would continue to take other, potentially dangerous for their 
health, performance-enhancing substances secretively, in order to maintain a 
positional performance advantage over fellow competitors. 
 
 
5. An alternative solution to lifting the ban on doping: changing the pay-off 
matrix 
 
The solution to lift the ban on doping and put doping under a medical context targets 
primarily the disincentives to dope – namely, fear of getting caught and health risks – 
and only tangentially addresses the incentives to dope (gaining competitive advantage 
and financial rewards for top performance).  
 
How might we change the incentives to doping instead? 
 
A first way of changing the financial rewards would be to change the financial 
incentives in professional sport.  
 
The great majority of elite athletes – mind you, elite athletes, not all athletes - do not 
receive a steady income and struggle to make ends meet through sponsorships and 
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other part-time incomes. Indeed, in many sports such as track and field, the average 
income of the athlete is quite low. They rarely receive stipends from the sport’s 
governing body and in the US, for example, the annual income (mostly through 
donations and gifts) for elite track and field athletes is only around $8,000-$10,000 
above the national poverty line of $11,880. On average, for each event, only five of 
the top 10 American athletes make more than $15,000 per year (Rudnitsky 2016). As 
put by Moran (2016), “For many elite U.S. athletes like Achtenberg, pursuing their 
sport is an expensive, full-time proposition that leaves them in precarious, or even 
dire, financial situations.” 
 
That is why they need sponsorship money to survive; that is why there are such strong 
incentives in place to break world records (Moran G 2016). Many athletes live on 
sponsorships (which often come with clauses about performance, injury, number of 
races, etc.) in absence of a steady income. Of course it goes without saying that 
sponsorships are given preferentially to male, good-looking athletes (preferentially 
white) (Topping 2012; Desbordes 2015) and to certain sports, making it difficult for 
the ‘average’ elite athlete to make a living. Health insurance and stipends are offered 
to only a very limited number of top-notch competitors. To survive, most Olympic 
athletes are “forced to cobble together an income made up of prize money, apparel 
contracts, grants and part-time work” (Rudnitsky 2016). Not all athletes have it that 
bad, but on average track and field athletes have quite a hard time making ends meet. 
Put simply, if an athlete is not the top of the top in his or her class or sport, he or she 
will struggle financially.   
 
I believe that sports federations need to seriously reconsider the ways in which 
professional sports can be made sustainable in the long term, so that athletes can have 
the financial security that is currently only associated with sponsorship money. I leave 
for another paper or other scholars to elaborate on the ways on which this could be 
done. 
 
Secondly, as I have argued above, we can start with the intuition (echoed in Atry’s 
concept of reactive attitudes) that athletes should not be the only ones held 
responsible for doping.  
 
Atry et al (2013) has attempted a preliminary outline of a theoretical framework for 
broadening the scope of responsibility in doping behaviours, drawing on Strawson’s 
(2008) relational concept of agency. He argues: ‘It seems reasonable to assert that the 
nature of asymmetries in power relations between individuals (e.g. coercion or 
manipulation) could significantly affect responsibility-seeking/assigning processes’ 
(Atry 2013: 45-6). I have argued before along similar lines in Camporesi and 
McNamee (2014) where I have outlined the ways in which athletes are vulnerable 
subjects in a system of unregulated clinical trials, characterised by lack of 
transparency, lack of visibility and lack of accountability for those who hold power. 
Having established that the concept of shared participatory responsibility for doping 
has a first intuitive basis, which can be observed in our social practices of emotional 
cultures as described by Atry, the next question is: What is the appropriate target of 
our reactive attitudes in doping? 
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The answer to this question, , we would first need a stakeholder analysis (Brugha et al 
2000) to understand who the relevant stakeholders are for each team, athlete 
entourage, or sport. WADA could require teams or individual athletes and their 
entourages to submit something akin to a classic organizational chart, showing who 
reports to whom, who pays whom, and who makes decisions for whom. Resources 
would need to be allocated to perform such investigations. 
 
The next step would be to assign liability to the appropriate stakeholder(s). Here, the 
individuals identified through a stakeholder analysis as possessing the most power or 
control over the athlete should become the target of our reactive attitudes in doping, 
and should be held personally liable for the doping of the athlete(s) under their 
control. 
 
A far-fetched proposal? Less than it may seem at first glance.  
 
A quote from Dr Michael Ashenden, former adviser to the World Anti-Doping 
Agency and the director of the research organization, recognises the systematic nature 
of doping enterprise 
 
“In recent years, the anti-doping movement has recognized the need to look 
upstream of sophisticated dopers toward the traffickers and facilitators who 
form an integral component of doping networks […] My opinion is that 
networks should be seen to comprise not just those who directly aid and abet 
dopers, but also those support staff, agents and sponsors who choose to turn a 
blind eye rather than undertake due diligence.” (Gatti 2013) 
 
It is also worth noting the 2015 Revision of WADA’s Code includes a clause 
according to which if in the same team two athletes are found to be doping, the 
upstream influences need to be investigated. (WADC 2015). However, what I am 
suggesting in this paper is a much more radical proposal. 
 
Indeed, assigning liability to those who wield power over the athlete(s), entourage, or 
team would be practically possible: there are regulations and laws in other contexts 
that could serve as a model.1 After the Enron scandal of 2001, for example, in which 
the large US company lied about its finances, the US Congress passed a law called the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that makes the top managers of a publicly traded 
company personally liable for any financial fraud that their company commits 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002)2.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I gratefully acknowledge legal scholar Jeffry J. Knuckles for having suggested to me the comparison 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 	  
2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed to curb false financial reporting to the US Security and 
Exchange Commission by publicly traded companies.  In essence, both the Chief Executive Officer 
(Ceo) and Chief Financial Officer (Cfo) of the company are subject to fines totalling $5 million and/or 
20 years in prison for falsely certifying the financial statements.  Likewise, external corporate auditing 
firms which advise public companies are liable for complicit misstatements of financial 
information. The sweeping reach of the Act touches even senior managers at the reporting company, 
their law firms, and internal auditors.  So pervasive is the Act that, though not required, its guidelines 
for accurate reporting have been extended to the "best practices" of foundations, private companies, 
and non-profit organizations.	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Applied to sports, we could envision regulation that holds the team owner, manager, 
or even the manager from the sponsoring company in charge of the sponsorship 
contract, personally liable if any team member or athlete is found to be in violation of 
a doping rule.  
 
 
Some will object that with a proposal to make owners, managers, and other 
stakeholders personally liable for athlete doping we are freeing individual athletes 
from personal responsibility for the choices they make regarding doping. While I 
recognise that individual athletes retain moral responsibility for their own actions 
even if under duress or psychological pressure, I think it is important to distinguish 
for the purposes of a policy proposal between moral responsibility and holding 
someone responsible/accountable, as outlined by Shockley (2007).  
 
While we could devise a way to leave some moral responsibility to athletes e.g. them 
from competing for a certain amount of time (Camporesi & Knuckles 2013), this is 
not what I aim to do in this paper. Here in I am advocating for a policy proposal 
aimed at changing the payoff matrix that makes doping possible and widespread in 
professional sports, and not going after the individual athletes who dope. In order to 
do so, I argue for adopting a pragmatic approach that asks the following question: 
Can we bring about positive consequences in the world by holding particular 
individuals in positions of power responsible?  
 
I think we can, and we should. That is why I am advocating that we should decide 
that, for the purposes of a policy proposal to reform WADA’s strict liability clause, 
that are shifting liability for doping away from athletes. To be absolutely clear, this 
would not mean that athletes would cease to not morally responsible (Shockley 2007) 
in the sense of being ‘blameworthy’, for doping but only that we would decide not to 
hold athletes accountable for doping on consequentialist grounds.  
 
In Strawson’s words (2008), our reactive attitudes of resentment/blame in doping 
should be shifted away from athletes to those who really hold the power and control 
in the system. Intuitively, this seems to be an appealing shift. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The problem of doping in sport is not about to go away any time soon.  
 
There are financial incentives in place that incentivise doping and there are data that 
show that doping is often a systematic, organised enterprise (either at team level, or at 
state-level). Athletes are vulnerable actors in a payoff matrix where their choices are 
often seriously constrained: either they dope, or they drop out of the professional 
system because they cease to be competitive.  
 
The main question to be answered today in professional sports is whether doping’s 
repressive anti-doping policies do not have greater negative consequences for society. 
While some have suggested legitimizing safe doping under medical control, in this 
paper I have argued that doing so will do little to prevent clandestine use of dangerous 
performance-enhancing substances. As an alternative to lifting the ban on doping I 
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have suggested that athletes should not be held liable for doping, and that liability dor 
doping should be shifted to those individuals who wield power over athletes in a 
specific context of professional sport (this would be determined in a case-specific 
fashion after having performed a context-specific stakeholder analysis  
 
 
Of course, the details of how to assign liability to appropriate stakeholders would 
have to be spelled out in practice and would differ for each individual sport. I can 
claim no expertise in the matter and the ways of how to do that would have to be 
carefully thought through a team-work of legal scholars, policy makers and with the 
input of philosophers of sport. The assumptions though, I think, are sound and there 
are the premises upon which to start to seriously think about how to do so in practice. 
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